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projects:policy_discussion [2010/05/25 15:43]
cormac
projects:policy_discussion [2010/05/25 15:49] (current)
cormac
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 ===== Information Flow Channels ===== ===== Information Flow Channels =====
-In this section we are trying to highlight various fields in JavaScript that an attacker can use to transmit information. We distinguish between immediate channels where modifying this fields sends information to an attacker and delayed channels were no information is sent to the attacker until the user performs some action.+In this section we  highlight various fields in JavaScript that an attacker can use to transmit information. We distinguish between immediate channels where modifying this fields sends information to an attacker and delayed channels were no information is sent to the attacker until the user performs some action.
  
 ==== Delayed Channels ==== ==== Delayed Channels ====
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 ===== Security Lattice ===== ===== Security Lattice =====
-For confidentiality,​ we assume that each origin may be its own security principal. In addition we have a LOCAL_ONLY ​label for data that should never leave the client. ​+For confidentiality,​ we assume that each origin may be its own security principal. ​ 
 +We note that '​http://​ucsc.edu'​ and '​http://​soe.ucsc.edu'​ are different principals,​ 
 +as are '​http://​ucsc.edu'​ and '​https://​ucsc.edu'​. 
 +In addition we have a LOCAL_ONLY ​principal ​for data that should never leave the client. ​
  
 In order to safely handle exfiltration attacks, we will also need a notion of integrity. ​ For all data, we will need to track which principals have influenced the data.  (Note that without declassification,​ the moment that more than one principal have affected any confidential data item, it becomes LOCAL_ONLY). In order to safely handle exfiltration attacks, we will also need a notion of integrity. ​ For all data, we will need to track which principals have influenced the data.  (Note that without declassification,​ the moment that more than one principal have affected any confidential data item, it becomes LOCAL_ONLY).
projects/policy_discussion.1274827395.txt.gz · Last modified: 2010/05/25 15:43 by cormac